The Paradoxes of Africa's Continentalization

Martin Welz[*]
University of Konstanz

Abstract

Africa's continental integration process is analyzed through three interrelated paradoxes. The sovereignty paradox argues that - contrary to the assumption that integration by definition requires states to cede sovereign rights - Africa's integration process *de facto* protects the sovereignty of states. Africa's leadership claims that there are collectively shared norms and values, but no evidence is found for that on the ground. The value paradox scrutinizes this. It is argued that Africa is more heterogeneous than often assumed. The interest paradox states that although Africa's leadership verbally express their commitment to the integration process, large parts of the leadership are in fact opposing integration for various reasons, including economic disadvantages and a perceived threat to their power bases. Beyond the empirical part, this paper argues that neo-functionalism as standard International Relations theory on integration processes can be applied to Africa's integration process. Drawing parallels to the European integration process, it is argued that there is no need to treat Africa as special case.

Introduction

Most scholars focus their analysis of regionalization and integration on economic drivers for the building of regions and ultimately the establishment of regional organizations. They fail to acknowledge the political dimension of regionalization, particularly in the case of

institutionalized regionalization, i.e. regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) or the European Union (EU).

Some scholars argue that Africa poses severe challenges to International Relations integration theories. They tend to treat Africa as a 'special case'. African politics are seen as different from politics in other parts of the world, particularly in terms of culture, understanding of core norms and values like human rights, democracy and rule of law. The argument bears some truth. Africa's political landscape comprises dictatorships and democracies; its leadership is diverse. It is more heterogeneous both in political and cultural terms than often assumed. This understanding of Africa's political arena informs the following analysis. The study pays special attention to the cultural and political divergence within the AU.

The present paper approaches the dynamics underlying the continental integration process, i.e. continentalization. It also looks at the process of institutionalizing the political cooperation of African states with a specific focus on the political and cultural dimension. Firstly, the paper challenges the predominant view that integration processes are always rooted in economy and trade and, secondly, the view that Africa needs to be treated as special case. Scrutinizing three interrelated paradoxes it provides empirical material to underscore the theoretical argument. The first paradox is concerned with the specific political and economic interests of AU member states. It is argued that many states promote continental integration rhetorically and with their signature under treaties but in fact oppose it for a variety of reasons. For instance, not all states are promoting the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) or the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) with vigour; their leaders often even undermine the principles of their own initiatives. Secondly, the value paradox states that there is no normative congruence among AU member states, i.e. collectively shared norms and values although Africa's leadership claims that the continental integration process is based on such norms and values. According to them, they find their expression in the Pan-African movement.[1] It will be argued that Pan-Africanism does not inform the continentalization and integration in Africa. Moreover, it is emphasized that promoted values such as respect for human rights and rule of law as well as good governance do not resonate in practical politics. The last paradox – the sovereignty paradox – describes the relationship between the definitional need to cede sovereign rights in the process of integration and the lack of willingness to surrender such rights in the case of the AU.

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[1] See e.g. Timothy Murithi 2005, *The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development.* Alderhot: Ashgate.

It is difficult to treat the paradoxes separately in the following analysis. Parts of the argument for one paradox are also part of the argumentation for another one. The paradoxes mingle with each other. They must be read and understood together to develop a holistic approach. A second word of caution shall be made at the outset: It is not assumed that the presented list of challenges to the continental integration process is exhaustive. These paradoxes form a significant obstacle to integration efforts. They are often overlooked both by academia and policymakers. Other well known challenges, including conflict resolution, poverty eradication and HIV/AIDS, also form significant obstacles the integration.

From a theoretical perspective, the paper argues that there is no need to treat Africa's continentalization efforts differently from similar developments in the global arena. The paper draws some parallels to the European integration process. Theories developed for integration processes in general can be applied to the 'African condition' as the critical analysis of the neo-functional approach throughout the paper shows.

Research on Continentalization

There is an extensive body of literature on the concepts of 'regionalization' and '(regional) integration'. The concepts are used in different ways and, beyond that, inconsistently.[2] Particularly the concept of 'regionalization' is subject to a broad discussion about what it refers to. Fishlow and Haggard e.g. distinguish between two forms of regionalization. On the one hand they define it as economic process which is characterized by trade and investment that grows faster within a region compared to the region's trade and investment with the rest of the world.[3] This process is politically unintended and occurs without specific policies of governments. By contrast, the other form of regionalization is defined as "the formation of political groupings or 'blocs' that aim to reduce intra-regional barriers to trade and investment."[4] In other words, it is politically intended. Therefore, the latter is seen as "unnatural regionalization."[5] Both understandings have at their core an economic perspective.

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[2] This paper does not attempt to contribute to this debate with a final conclusion. This section shall outline the understanding of the terms as they are understood for the purpose if this paper.
[3] Albert Fishlow and Stephan Haggard 1992, *The United States and the Regionalization of the World Economy*. Paris: OECD, p. 12.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid, p. 13.

Like Fishlow and Haggard, a whole strand of work on regionalization focuses mainly on the economic dimension of the process.[6] The neo-functional approach sees the economy as the starting point of any integration process. Subsequent 'spill-over' effects to other policy fields are possible.[7] Fishlow and Haggard stand in this tradition since they assume that "some threshold of economic integration is necessary for successful regional political groupings to form."[8]

Barry Buzan argues with a broader perspective, yet with a similar message. He and Richard Little analyse the historic development of the international system.[9] Drawing on this Barry Buzan emphasizes a 'golden rule' which states that economy always developed first in the international system over time. Trade appears as the engine for development of the international system. The development of political systems comes only in second place. Forming a collective identity is seen as the last step.[10]

As will be highlighted in this paper, it seems wrong to assume that any integration process must be driven by economic cooperation and trade. The political desire to achieve stability in political and security terms can also be a starting point for integration. Therefore, political and cultural factors are given preference when approaching integration and continentalization.

So far the terms 'integration' and 'regionalization/continentalization' were used more or less synonymously. In fact, it is difficult to distinguish between regionalization and integration. Regionalization and integration are two theoretical concepts which are closely linked. Therefore it is necessary to differentiate between the two at the outset of the analysis. Regionalization is understood here as the pursuit to create a regional system in a defined geographic area either for a specific purpose, i.e. intensifying trade and investment, securing political stability, or for a more general purpose.[11] It is a dynamic process. Regional

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[6] See e.g. Edward Mansfield and Helen Milner, 1999 'The new Wave of Regionalism'. *International Organization*, Vol. 53 (3), pp. 589-627; Jagdish Bhagwati 1993, 'Regionalism and Multilateralism: an Overview'. Pp.: 22-57 in *New Dimensions in Regional Integration*, Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds.). Cambridge: University Press; and Jaime de Melo and Arvind Panagariya 1993 *New Dimensions in Regional Integration*. Cambridge: University Press.

[7] Ernst Haas 1958, 'The Challenge of Regionalism'. *International Organization* Vol. 12 (4) pp. 440-458 and Ernst Haas 1970, 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing'. *International Organization*, Vol. 4 (4), pp. 607-646. p. 611. and

[8] Fishlow and Haggard 1992, *The United States and the Regionalization of the World Economy*, p. 12.

[9] See Barry Buzan and Richard Little 2000, *International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of International Relations*. Oxford: University Press.

[10] Barry Buzan, Lecture delivered at the London School of Economic and Political Science, 9 October 2006.

[11] See Andrew Grant and Fredrik Söderbaum 2003, 'Introduction: The new Regionalism in Africa'. Pp. 1-17 in *The New Regionalism in Africa'* Andrew Grand and Fredrik Söderbaum (eds.). Aldershot: Ashgate.

integration is defined similarly. Haas highlights that integration is "the creation of political communities defined in institutional and attitudinal terms."[12] In other words, integration is an institutionalized process of forming political units. This institutionalized character of the units becomes further apparent when Haas writes that integration is "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions posses or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states."[13] The difference between the two concepts of integration and regionalization is that the former is intentional and driven by political actors. In this sense it is 'unnatural'. By contrast regionalization can occur unintentionally for not necessarily defined purposes and *can* be driven by non-state actors. Following this understanding, regional integration includes elements of regionalization. In contrast to an influential school of thought as outlined above, this paper has a broader view of regionalization, including political, cultural and economic factors. Taking this into account, regionalization is understood as a dynamic which inspires the forging of a political unit while integration is seen as a process of institutionalizing a political or economic cooperation.

Whereas it remains unclear how regions are defined geographically in the context of regionalization and integration debates, this paper has no need to engage in this debate as it has a fixed research object, namely the AU. The latter comprises all African states, with the exception of Morocco. Since it is clear that the whole of Africa is included in the analysis, the term 'regionalization' is replaced by 'continentalization' referring to the specific research object, namely the dynamics that underlie the continental integration processes in Africa in the shape of the AU. The advantage of the term lies in the fact that it stresses the AU as collective body and sets the focus on the continental level and not - as most other studies - do on the sub-regional level.

Having elaborated the main terms, the following three sections provide empirical material on continentalization and integration in Africa. The regional level, e.g. southern Africa's SADC or West Africa's ECOWAS, are not included in this study. The analysis moves along the three postulated paradoxes: firstly the interest paradox, secondly the value paradox and lastly the sovereignty paradox. Before concluding, the empirical material is linked to neo-functionalism.

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[12] Ernst Haas 1970, *The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing.* p. 611.
[13] Ernst Haas 1968, *The Uniting of Europe*. Stanford: University Press, p. 16.

The Interest-Paradox

Africa's leadership is engaged in a seemingly endless debate about Africa's continental integration process since the late 1950s. Yet, little has been achieved so far. The AU with its wide range of institutions replaced the outdated OAU in 2001.[14] The lack of commitment to the AU, which results in it holding only a low range of competences, is weakening the organization and preventing it from moving into a strong position in the global arena. The reasons for its relative weakness are various. They range from a lack of resources to a lack of financial support from the industrialized countries to lack of political will. This section focuses on the latter. The debate about the establishment of a 'Union Government for Africa', as discussed since 2006 and endorsed by the AU Summit in Accra in July 2007[15], is a repetitively used example in the following analysis. The Union Government shall be the executive body within the AU structure similarly to the EU Commission. The debate reveals that AU members endorse the continental integration verbally but fail to translate their expressed commitment into realpolitik. This forms the first paradox: the vehement urge for a union of African states and the strengthening of the AU does not resonate in practical politics. Rhetoric does not match political reality. Some initiatives are undermined by their originators, such as the APRM. Some states' specific interests run contrary to the strengthening of the AU. The lack of commitment to the AU and its institutions has sustainable repercussions on the process of continentalization. It does not inspire the integration process.

There are different reasons why African states are not committed to continental integration, including feared economic and prestige disadvantages and a perceived threat of some leaders that their power base will be threatened by the *de facto* influx of values concerned with good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights. Additionally, some states simply argue – for good reasons – that the time is not ripe for a continental government. As a result, all three groups show a lack of political will to move forward. Paradoxically, they endorse integration in rhetoric. As a matter of fact, the Accra Declaration, which urges for the establishment of the Union Government and the formation of the United States of Africa, was endorsed unanimously

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[14] Joram Mukama Biswaro 2005, *Perspectives on Africa's Integration and Cooperation from OAU to AU: 'Old Wine in a new* Bottle' Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House.
[15] African Union, *Accra Declaration,* 3 July 2007.

Firstly, there are states which will benefit little in economic terms if integration moves on. Swaziland is such a case. There are other disadvantages which might emerge if integration were to proceed. An interesting case study is Ethiopia which fears that its national capital might lose the status as capital of Africa. The following two case studies are not mentioned to generalize. They are introduced to show that some countries have a hidden agenda. It is assumed that each country has such an agenda. States like Swaziland have in fact an interest that the continental and sub-regional integration does not precede. About two thirds of the country's national budget is composed of the income from tariffs of the South Africa Customs Union, as an insider remarks.[16] This customs union comprises Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Through the distribution of tariffs which are biased in favour of the smaller and poorer states of the union, South Africa provides hidden subsidies to Lesotho and Swaziland, making the customs union a beneficial venture for them. The moment a free trade area is set up in southern Africa or in the whole of Africa the small states lose these benefits. Two thirds of the national budget is at stake. Hence, Swaziland sees little benefit in the short and medium term to integrate further. They prefer the *status quo.* This in turn has apparent consequences for the regionalization and continentalization as their leaders contribute nothing to these dynamics.

It is not only small states which have little interest to move forward with the integration. Ethiopia as a special case shall be briefly elaborated on. Ethiopia's hidden agenda is driven by the fear that its national capital Addis Ababa will lose its status as 'capital of Africa'.[17] They fear that any changes in the AU structure could result in a further move away from Addis Ababa. The 2004 inaugurated Pan-African Parliament is hosted by South Africa. The same is true for the NEPAD Secretariat. Moreover, the AU Human Rights Court is hosted by Tanzania. Only the AU Commission and related departments, as well as the Peace and Security Council remain in Addis Ababa. The city's position as sole capital of Africa came under further fire when Gaddafi proposed at the AU Sharm El Sheikh Summit in 2008 to hold every summer summit in Sirte, Libya. Gaddafi wanted to develop Sirte, the place where he was born, into an important AU location but failed to get support for his proposal at the summit. These incidences show how Addis Ababa's status is under constant threat. The Ethiopian government sees continentalization dynamics as a threat, as it might raise question

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[16] Interview with a member of the diplomatic corps, Pretoria, April 2009.
[17] Interview with an African diplomat, April 2009.

why most institutions are located in Addis Ababa, which stands against a truly continental spirit of sharing the benefits not only in economical terms but also in prestigious ones.

The second dimension to be analysed is the perceived threat which emanates from continentalization. Since the ultimate end of apartheid and the genocide in Rwanda (both in 1994) as well as in the wake of an emerging global norm referred to as the 'responsibility to protect' and under immense pressure from donors, parts of Africa's leadership have been promoting norms and values like respect for human rights, good governance and rule of law and above all democracy. This movement found its expression in the NEPAD initiative which is a "vision and strategic framework for Africa's renewal."[18] NEPAD includes the APRM, a mechanism which monitors the achievements in four fields: 'democracy and political governance', 'economic governance and management', 'corporate governance' and 'socio-economic development'.[19] The APRM is used as proof to show that Africa in general is becoming a more democratic continent where rule of law and human rights are respected. Africa's leadership used the APRM as argument to convince the G8 leaders at the Gleneagles summit in 2005 to disencumber African states. But do the signatory states of the APRM really want to be monitored? Do they accept the criticism they receive? Do they implement the plan of action?[20]

It is cynical that the APRM Forum, the highest committee of the APRM initiative is chaired by Meles Zenawi, Ethiopia's Prime Minister. Ethiopia is only ranked as 'partly free' in the Freedom House Index 2008.[21] Indeed, Ethiopia's status as democracy is questionable: its government silenced domestic opposition in 2001[22] and its press is not free. Interviews with journalists in Addis Ababa showed that the press is subject to subtle oppression from the government.[23] Leaders like Zenawi perceive an influx of democracy and pressure to *de facto* implement democratic values in their own countries as threat to their power base. The Ethiopian government seems to be afraid of what is considered as western ideas. It recently introduced a law making it impossible for foreign NGOs to operate freely in Ethiopia. All

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[18] New Partnership for Africa's Development. http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php (accessed at 11 May 2009)

[19] New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI), http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/110.pdf (accessed at 5 May 2009).

[20] For an assessment of the first four states' APRM process see Ross Herbert and Steven Gruzd 2008, *The African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from the Pioneers*, Johannesburg: SAIAA.

[21] Freedom House Index 2008, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2008 (accessed at 8 May 2009).

[22] *Africa Research Bulletin,* May 1st-31st 2001: p. 14407 A-C

[23] Interview with a Journalist in Addis Ababa, November 2008.

NGOs which receive more than 20% of their budget from outside Ethiopia are not allowed to work in the fields of democracy and human rights.[24] This gives an indication how worried the country's government is. It is unlikely that the APRM report will highlight the shortcomings of Ethiopia's democracy. There is rumour around the AU and diplomatic circle that the Ethiopian government is trying fiercely to manipulate the APRM report that is currently written about the situation in Ethiopia.[25] Since Zenawi chairs the APRM forum, he has room to manoeuvre. He has influence in the renewal of the contracts of the APRM high rank officials and the appointment of the eminent persons which mainly accomplish the review process.

Ethiopia is not the only one trying to influence its report. The Mbeki-administration was not satisfied with the APRM report on South Africa and tried to whitewash the report.[26] With this manoeuvre Mbeki undermined his own initiative. Even Mauritius, considered as one of the democratic model states in Africa, failed to complete the APRM as they did not take the initiative serious enough and therefore did not comply with the APRM-standards.[27]

Despite these setbacks the pure existence of the APRM initiative is remarkable in the sense that Africa's leadership is engaging in a debate about shortcomings of their own 'democracies'. Where else in the world do governments allow discussions on their policies in international forums and the publishing of reports on them? Still, so far the APRM is a mere lip-service. The plans of actions which should follow the recommendation of the review report are not thoroughly implemented. This raises doubts about the effectiveness of the mechanisms and their long term effects. Moreover, the above-mentioned cases uncover serious doubts whether Africa's leadership really wants to be thoroughly monitored. So far it does not look that way. As a consequence, the APRM initiative opens only little space for values related to democracy to spread on the continent. Large parts of Africa's current leadership are keen on guarding the *status quo*.

It has become clear by now that the some parts of Africa's leadership are not as committed to core values related to democracy as their rhetoric and signatures imply. This finding is

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[24] *Tagesspiegel online* (8 January 2009) 'Äthiopien nimmt Helfer unter Aufsicht', http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/ international/afrika/Menschenrechte%3Bart1287,2700003 (accessed at 6 May 2009).
[25] Interviews with diplomats and AU officials from various African countries between November 2008 and April 2009.
[26] *Business Day* (5 July 2007), 'NGO body opens fire on SA's 'exclusionary' peer review'; and *Mail and Guardian* (1 February 2007), 'Which Peers will Mbeki listen to?'
[27] Herbert/ Gruzd 2008, *The African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from the Pioneers*, pp.243-254.

certainly not new. All dictatorships in history tried to maintain a democratic façade. The different interpretations of democracy pose a huge challenge for Africa's continentalization. In fact, the unwillingness of Africa's leadership to implement democratic rights on the ground and to comply with them make the proceeding of continentalization a difficult undertaking. Many leaders perceive democratic values as threat, as the cases Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mauritania, Sudan, Swaziland and Zimbabwe – to name just a few – show. They remain interested in keeping the *status quo* and perceive a preceding continentalization as a threat to their regimes' power base as this dynamic might give momentum to another wave of democratization on the continent.

It is noteworthy that all non-democratic states have positioned themselves against the immediate establishment of a Union Government for Africa. The leadership of these states has no interest in ceding power. They will only surrender sovereign rights if it is necessary for the regime's survival or if it is highly beneficial for the regime. Like the case of Zimbabwe suggests, the AU is seen as threat. Its un-democratic leadership[28] opposes the idea of a Union Government for Africa. Mugabe made this implicitly clear by stating on 28 June 2008, the day before the election: "No country in the world, including those in the African Union and SADC, can dictate how Zim[babwe] should conduct its elections."[29] He made clear that he would not subordinate himself to any rules and regulations set up by the AU. Other dictators in Africa certainly share this view. Al-Bashir is another case in point. The arrest warrant issued recently is widely condemned, particularly by the northern Africa states. Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi also made clear that he would not extradite Sudan's President al-Bashir to an international court in case he entered Ethiopia, e.g. when participating at a AU meeting. Zenawi gave Al Bashir a *carte blanche* and backed him.[30]

Libya – clearly not a democracy – is an exception in the Union Government debate. Libya is actually the engine of integration. Its leader wants to establish the Union Government immediately. This is due to Gaddafi's personal interest. He would like to be the President of the United States of Africa as his crowning as 'King of the Kings' in February 2009 clearly

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[28] Despite the Unity Government in Zimbabwe which was established in February 2009, it is assumed the ZANU-PF under President Mugabe rules the country. Any claims made above therefore solely refer to the ZANU-PF government.
[29] *The Herald* (27 June 2008), Harare, p.1.
[30] Meles Zenawi interviewed in 'Hard Talk' on *BBC World*, 9 April 2009.

indicates.[31] He sees himself as an elder statesman who generously supports other Africa states financially. He demands respect and influence for this.

Lastly, there are numerous states arguing that the time is not ripe to establish a Union Government. Most of them draw parallels with the European integration process and argue that it took the Europeans many decades to forge a strong political union and Africa needs the same time. They furthermore refer to the regional economic communities, such as SADC and ECOWAS, to serve as building blocs for the United States of Africa. As observers remark, this are pure delaying tactics.[32] Indeed, these states are opposing the idea. It is part of Africa's political culture to listen to a fellow leader and treat his ideas and visions seriously. It they really wanted the AU to grow stronger they would have done more, e.g. starting to implement a common African passport or implement economic treaties such as the Abuja Treaty of 1991, which includes a roadmap for a common market and a monetary union until 2027. These states' position implies two noteworthy arguments. First, the establishment of the OAU marks the end of Pan-Africanism.[33] The organization fixed the boarders as set by the colonial powers. The AU-member states who argue that the time is not ripe show that they are not willing to change the borderlines in the near future, as the Pan-African spirit requires. Secondly, their arguments that the regional economic communities must be the building blocs of the AU, indicates an awareness that the normative congruence on the continent is not as big as their rhetoric often suggests.[34] In fact, as argued in greater detail below, there seems to be no normative basis for the continental integration process.

All these have significant impacts on the integration process itself, which is stalled by the reluctance of African states to move forward. Yet, this ongoing debate might have a positive effect for the continentalization dynamic. It implicitly fired the debate about the cultural basis of the integration process and helps to clarify this matter. Only a few intellectuals and politicians engage in this challenging debate. Too easily do they refer back to Pan-Africanism and the collective suffering under colonialism and do not open avenues for a more progressive debate.[35] The following analysis of the value-paradox elaborates on this.

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[31] *The Star* (3 February 2009), 'Leaders Hail 'King of the Kings': Gaddafi's Dream: United States of Africa.'
[32] Interviews with close observers of the African integration process from international NGOs and other AU related institutions.
[33] Also see next section.
[34] Yoweri Kaguta Museveni 2007, *Towards a closer Co-Operation in Africa, Brainstorming Session of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs/External Relations on the African Union*, Addis Ababa, 8-9 May 2007.
[35] Interviews conducted with various Ambassadors from African states to the AU as well as with AU officials. Addis Ababa, November 2008.

The Value-Paradox

Buzan and Haas' designs of economy as the initial driver, followed by political development, appear not to fit for the AU. The AU seems – on the surface – different from other institutionalized integration processes in the global arena in this regard as it is not primarily an economic organization. According to its founding fathers, the AU is built on a cultural foundation called 'Pan-Africanism'.[36] In other words, African states are said to have a common 'African' culture and share a set of norms and values. This view is challenged here. It is argued that there are serious doubts that a Pan-African spirit even exists. It would have to be found in *all* African states, north and south of the Sahara, in Christian and Muslim states, in developed and less developed states as well as in former colonies and states which were never colonized. Even if such a spirit exists, the point made is that it does not resonate in political reality and, more importantly in this context of this paper, it does not resonate in any continentalization dynamics.

It appears that a Pan-African spirit was strong during the liberation struggle, particularly in its early phase at the beginning of the 20th century and at its height in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) marks the end of the Pan-Africanism and not as many scholars often argue an institutionalization of it.[37] The evidence for this claim is obvious: Pan-Africanism promoted the unity of Africans.[38] The founders of the OAU, however, have not opted for an 'African state', but instead accepted the boarders as set by the colonial powers. They made 'sovereignty' and 'non-interference' as untouchable guiding principles of the OAU and destroyed all hopes of the Pan-Africanists who dreamt of the 'United States of Africa'.[39] Until today, there is no sign that Pan-Africanism re-emerged. The African Renaissance project started by South Africa's former President Thabo Mbeki draws on the Pan-African movement, yet, as political disputes on the Renaissance's practical policies (NEPAD, APRM) show, there is no agreement on the ground. Taking the renaissance project's main objectives to promote democracy as an example, it reveals that there is no collective understanding of this principle. The Zimbabwean elections of 2008 uncover the split between those backing Mugabe and those criticizing him. This split

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[36] Kwame Nkrumah 1965, *Africa must unite*, London: Heinemann.
[37] Timothy Murithi 2005, *The African Union*.
[38] Colin Legum 1969, 'The Roots of Pan-Africanism' in Colin Legum (ed) *Africa Handbook.* Harmonsworth, Penguin, p. 541-555.
[39] Kwame Nkrumah 1965, *Africa must unite*.

follows largely the split between democratic and non-democratic states in Africa. In short, core principles like democracies are not shared and/or collectively defined.

The Union Government debate demonstrates that Africa's leadership is divided about how to proceed with integration. There is no shared vision. The debate moreover reveals that in terms of understanding core values like respect for human rights, good governance and rule of law, African states differ. This is by no means odd. The AU comprises 53 states which are far more heterogeneous than so often assumed in the western thinking. In fact, we too often forget that Africa is a continent, not a country.[40] The same is true for the EU, particularly after the enlargement of 2005 when former communist states joined the union. As the split on the question how to respond to the US-led war in Iraq showed, there is disagreement on vital questions in this union, too. Moreover, the question whether Turkey should become part of the EU gives an indication how cultural values influence the discussion in the European arena and how heated it becomes when 27 states sit at the negotiation table and discuss such a fundamental matter. The AU is almost twice as large in terms of member states and arguably even more heterogeneous in cultural terms than the EU.

Having written this, it becomes clear that the AU is no exception in terms of cultural heterogeneity. Like other integration processes in the global arena there is no common culture shared by *all* members. Continentalization is not inspired and driven by a common culture called Pan-Africanism or a similar spirit. There is no evidence for this. The African case postulates no example that Buzan's claim - that a collective identity develops last - is wrong.

The main argument is that there are no shared norms and values and that Africa is a heterogeneous continent in terms of political understanding and culture. Paradoxically, the leadership claims that normative congruence is given. Moreover, the AU's policy on the one hand promotes 'collective' political values like respect for democracy, human rights and rule of law as well as unity; but on the other hand they do little to bring these norms and values into fruition. Under these restrictive conditions there is only little space for collective values and norms to emerge - which in turn could fire continentalization and thus move integration forward.

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[40] Maxi Schoeman 2003, *The African Union after the Durban 2002 Summit*. University of Copenhagen: Centre of African Studies.

The list of treaties and protocols which promote the vision of a more democratic and reliable Africa is long. To name just a few: African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981), Charter on Popular Participation (1990), Algiers decision on Unconstitutional Changes of Government (1999), Lome Declaration on the framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes (2000), The New Partnership for Africa's Development (2001), Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003), Charter for African Cultural Renaissance (2006) and African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007).[41] It is beyond the scope of this paper to elaborate on these documents in detail. They aim at promoting human rights, popular participation, economic and political development as well as democracy and good governance, they aim at strengthening the position of females and they condemn unconstitutional change. Most of them remain lip service, as the cases around Mugabe, al-Bashir and recent developments in Madagascar show.

Realpolitik is in fact different. The AU does little to foster unity on a continental scale. Initiatives to launch an African passport are blocked. The Pan-African Parliament, a parliament on the continental level to represent the people of the Africa, suffers severe shortcomings. The parliamentarians are not elected by the population of the AU-member states, which means that 'AU-citizens' choose their representatives not directly which in turn means the parliamentarians legitimacy and accountability is undermined. By the way, the term 'AU citizens' is not officially used, which underscores the argument. Moreover, the 2009 budget of the parliament was cut by 22 %, which means that the Pan-African parliament cannot exercise its tasks fully.[42] This demonstrates how little Africa's leadership supports the Pan-African Parliament. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the AU is a council established to "promote continuous dialogue between all segments of the African people on issues concerning Africa and its future [… and to] promote the participation of African civil society in the implementation of the policies and programmes of the Union."[43] It remains a mere lip-service with no significant impact on the policies of the AU. Similarly, experiences from South Africa's APRM process show that some states show little interest to include civil society in their conduct of policy.[44]

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[41] African Union: *OAU/AU Treaties, Conventions, Protocols, Charters.* http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/ Documents /Treaties/treaties.htm (accessed at 9 May 2009)
[42] Interview with the acting Clerk of the Pan-African Parliament, Midrand, April 2009.
[43] African Union, *Statutes of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union.* http://www.africa-union.org/ECOSOC/STATUTES-En.pdf (accessed at 10 May 2009).
[44] *Mail and Guardian* (8 February 2007), 'Mbeki stalls Peer Review.'

There is little action on the grassroots level to drive continentalization. The reason is obviously a lack of resources and capacity. The underdevelopment of many African states[45] resonates in their inability to engage in continental affairs. Two examples highlight the problem: Many states struggle to afford tickets for their Pan-African Parliament members to fly to the plenary sessions of the parliament.[46] Sometime states are not represented in the session for this reason. Rwanda has no research institutes or think tanks in their own country, which could have conducted the desk research for the APRM process. Rwanda assigned this task to South African research institutes.[47] Both incidences indicate how little resources are available. The situation in relatively wealthy countries is different. In South Africa, the important trade union movement and its umbrella organization COSATU (Congress of South African Trade Unions) have no position on the Union Government debate.[48] This is remarkable, considering that COSATU, the South African Communist Party and the officially governing African National Congress form the 'Tripartite Alliance' which is *the* alliance making policy in South Africa. The fact that COSATU has no position on the Union Government tells a story how serious the issue is debated on the ground. The AU seems off the radar. Mauritius serves as the last example to underline the argument that many African states have no interest in the integration. The island state failed to complete the APRM *inter alia* because it has not used sufficient resources. Officials say that the government gives no priority to the APRM. There are other policy fields which the government considers more important.[49] Taking these examples into account it becomes clear that there are no continentalization dynamics stemming from the grassroots level.

Under the described conditions it is difficult to imagine that collectively shared values emerge on a continental scale. The emergence is blocked at the very initial stage, as the limited competences of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council and the Pan-African Parliament show. The emergence of common values stands against the interest of many leaders as outlined above and against their understanding of the sovereign nation state as describes next. Although it is claimed that the AU has a common cultural and normative foundation, there is no evidence for this claim.

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[45] 25 out of 26 states classified with 'low human development' according the Human Development Index are African states. See *United National Development Programme*, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics (accessed 10 May 2009)

[46] Interviews at the Pan-African Parliament March and April 2009.

[47] Herbert/ Gruzd 2008, *The African Peer Review Mechanism: Lessons from the Pioneers*, pp. 222-224.

[48] Interview with COSATU spokesperson Patrick Craven, Johannesburg, April 2009.

[49] Interviews with different diplomats from Mauritius, November 2008- April 2009.

The Sovereignty-Paradox

Continental integration in Africa – and to a certain extent regional integration as well – is severely hampered by a lack of willingness to cede sovereign rights.[50] Institutionalized integration by definition requires states to transfer sovereign rights to the supra-national body they are establishing.[51] If governments are unwilling to cede certain rights than the supra-national body likely to fail as it has no political power to achieve its goals and meet its objectives. As the Union Government debate reveals, Africa's leadership is currently not willing to surrender national sovereignties. As result of the refusal to surrender sovereignty integration is largely stalled. Continentalization dynamics stemming from Africa's national governments thus remain absent.

Many scholars have emphasized the role 'sovereignty' plays on the African continent.[52] Sovereignty is considered as one of the most important principles in Africa's post-colonial political arena. The importance of this principle becomes nowhere more apparent than in the founding documents of the OAU and AU. In both sovereignty and its 'protective belt', the principle of 'non-interference' are placed at the centre of the organizations' principles.[53] Both documents stress the sovereign independence and integrity of the AU-members. Whereas sovereignty was absolute in the OAU, it was undermined in the AU. Yet it remains strong. The main difference between the OAU and the AU is that the Constitutive Act of the AU allows for interventions in grave circumstances namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.[54] Since 2003, the AU had intervened in four conflicts by military means. These were Burundi (2003), Darfur (2005), Somalia (2007) and Comoros (2008). This leads scholars to argue that a paradigm shift from the doctrine of non-interference to a doctrine of non-indifference occurred in Africa.[55] It must be stressed that for example in the case of

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[50] Admore Kambuzi 2008, 'Portrayal of a possible Path to a single Government for Africa'. Pp. 13-28 in Murithi, Timothy, *Towards a Union Government for Africa: Challenges and Opportunities.* ISS Monograph Series No. 140. Also subject to forthcoming publications of the author of the present paper.

[51] Ernst Haas 1970, *The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing*, p. 610.

[52] E.g. Laurie Nathan 2004. *The Absence of Common Values and Failure of Common Security in Southern Africa 1992-2003*. Crisis State Research Center LSE, Working Paper No. 50; Admore Kambuzi 2008, *Portrayal of a possible Path to a single Government for* Africa.

[53] *Charter of the Organisation of African Unity*: Articles II 1 c; III 1, 2 and *Constitutive Act of the African Union*: Article 4 a, g.

[54] *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, Article 4 h.

[55] Samuel Makinda and Wafula Okumu 2008, *The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security, and Governance*. London: Routledge; Baffour Ankomah 2007, 'African Union: From non-interference to non-indifference'. *New African*, pp. 10–12; Corinne Packer and Donald Rukare 2002, 'The New African Union and Its Constitutive Act'. *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 96 (2), pp. 365–379.

Darfur the AU is invited by the Sudanese government. "Sudan actually asked them [the AU] to help. [...] So the sovereign right of Sudan is still intact. Definitely."[56] The Sudanese government thus maintains its full sovereignty. The moment the government decides that the AU troops are to leave, they must leave Sudan. Similar conditions apply for other interventions. Taking this into account it becomes clear that the principle of sovereignty has yet not been undermined sustainably.

Sovereignty remains a pivotal guiding principle within the AU. The Union Government debate reveals this The AU Assembly of Heads of States and Governments decided in 2007 that they want to create the 'United States of Africa' with a Union Government as intermediate step.[57] At the same time, they introduced a ministerial committee to explore avenues for the Union Government. The mandate of the committee was *inter alia* the "identification of domains of competence and *the impact of the establishment of the Union Government on the sovereignty of member states*."[58] Further documents on the Union Government stress the importance that the sovereignty of the AU-member states must remain untouched.[59] It remains unclear how such a Union Government shall function when there is no sign that the countries which should be subordinated are not willing to give up larger parts of their sovereignty.

Swaziland's policy toward the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe is a case in point to show how the principle of non-interference works in practice. As a high official of the Swazi government points out, non-interference is *the* guiding principle of his government. The principle finds its application when Swaziland's royal government does not criticize Zimbabwe's President Mugabe for rigging the presidential elections of 2008. Swaziland in turn demands from other African states not to interfere in their domestic politics.[60] This request is widely respected as the lack of critique from African states towards Swaziland shows.[61] Since 1973, political parties – widely considered an essential part of democracies –

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[56] Interview with a high official from the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Addis Ababa, November 2008.
[57] African Union, *Accra Declaration,* 3 July 2007.
[58] African Union, *Accra Declaration,* 3 July 2007. (emphasis added)
[59] E.g. Assembly/AU/11/(XI), *Report of the First Meeting of the Committee of Twelve Heads of State and Government of the Union Government*. Arusha, 22-23 May 2008.
[60] Interview at Lozitha Palace, Swaziland April 2009.
[61] Also see the reluctance on behalf of the Pan-African Parliament observer mission to the 2008 parliamentary elections is Swaziland. There is only little criticism in the report about the democratic situation. *Pan-African Parliament* 2008, http://www.pan-africanparliament.org/DocumentsResources_DisplayDocument.aspx?Type=Docs&ID=1045.

have been banned in the tiny kingdom.[62] The king rules as an absolute monarch, in whom the executive, legislative and judicial powers are vested. His strong grip on power, the ban of political parties as well as the fact that there is no freedom of assembly[63], leave little space for the democratization of Swaziland.

The above-mentioned case of the Sudanese President al-Bashir is in line with this case study. Al-Bashir will experience no intimidation when he travels to other African countries that have not signed the protocol related to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). 23 out of 53 have not signed yet.[64] This means that al-Bashir can travel to all these countries as they consider the jurisdiction of the ICC not binding without a threat of extradition. Other African states also condemned the arrest warrant against al-Bashir, giving him a *carte blanche*.

The cases showed how important sovereignty and non-interference are considered in large parts of Africa's political arena. The paradox resulting from the AU's strong adherence to the principle of sovereignty is that the institutionalized integration which by definition requires state to surrender sovereignty *de facto* guards the sovereignty of the member states. This runs against any existing integration theory. Integration ultimately aims at achieving a union of states. Haas once used the phrase "denationalization of normal governments".[65] Integration is supposed to erode state structures by assigning certain sovereign rights to a supra-national body. This is the case in the EU. The AU by contrast preserves it.

AU member states also committed themselves to a union of states as the Accra Declaration highlights. The political reality, however, does not live up to rhetoric, as shown above. The AU, with sovereignty and territorial integrity as two of its guiding principles, ensures the survival of its member states – irrespective of the states' weakness. Moreover, the AU ensures the survival of its member-states' regimes as the cases Comoros, Mauritania, Togo and Zimbabwe point out, by granting legitimacy to the governments and making sure that no unconstitutional regime change could take place. It is remarkable that the AU even helped a

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[62] See e.g. Joshua Bheki Mzizi 2006, *Political Movements and the Challenges for democracy in Swaziland*. Johannesburg: EISA; and Ko Adinkrah 1991, '"We shall take our Case to the King": Legitimacy and Tradition in the Administration of Law in Swaziland' in *Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa*, Vol. 14 (2), p. 226-239.
[63] UNHCR 2008, *Freedom in the World 2008 – Swaziland*. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/type ANNUALREPORT,,SWZ,487ca260c,0.html (accessed at 12 May 2009).
[64] International Criminal Court 2008, *International Criminal Court - Assembly of State Parties*. www.icc-cpi.int/region&id=3.html (accessed at 28 July 2008).
[65] Ernst Haas 1958, *The Challenge of Regionalism*.

new state to come into being. By widely granting recognition and accepting the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (widely known as West Sahara) as member of the AU, the organization was instrumental in creating a state with sovereign rights.

Sovereignty poses one of the biggest obstacles on the way to the 'United States of Africa', i.e. the proceeding of the integration process. It must be stressed that the situation in Europe was and is similar. The recent 'no' of the Irish and French citizens in their plebiscites on the proposed EU Constitution are just two cases showing how sovereignty is still guarded in the EU. The difference is that there is a movement in the EU on the grassroots level in favour for the integration which fires the regionalization of Europe. A similar movement is missing in Africa. It is not even in sight. This is due to repressive national governments *inter alia*. Moreover, whereas European leadership sees the advantages in the integration and became the driving force of the regionalization, Africa's leadership is reluctant to drive the integration and spearhead continentalization. One main reason is the sovereignty which is guarded jealously. Hence, unlike Europe, there are no continentalization dynamics in Africa. Moreover, the discussion of the interest paradox showed how integration runs contrary to many regimes' interests.

Implications for Theories

There are a couple of implications for contemporary International Relations theories which can be applied for integration processes. Neo-functionalism remains the main stream International Relations theory in this regard. This section briefly looks at the theory arguing that there is no need to treat Africa as a 'special case'.

Neo-functionalism sees its task in theorizing about "how and why state cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty."[66] In other words, neo-functionalists explore the reasons why states cooperate in an institutionalized way while transferring sovereign rights. This set of questions is universal and can be ask with reference to any integration effort in the

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[66] Ernst Haas 1970, *The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing*, p. 610.

global arena even though neo-functionalism was established in the historic context of Europe's integration and massively draws on the European experience.[67]

It was argued above that African states are not willing to cede sovereign rights. This statement requires some qualification. There is a need to stress that the establishment of the AU with its institutions like the Peace and Security Council and the Pan-African Parliament has already a surrendering of sovereign rights as result. This abandonment of sovereignty is, however, on a low scale as the cases outlined above indicate. Nevertheless, there is sovereignty transferred. This means that the questions neo-functionalism asks can also be employed to address the AU's integration process. There is no need to adjust the theory in this regard.

The neo-functionalist approach focuses mainly on the European project and cannot been taken out of its historical context without caution, as is the case with any other theory, particularly in the field of International Relations. Functionalists drew on the experiences of two World Wars and the failure of the League of Nations to solve global crises. The impetus for functionalists was to find ways to secure not only peaceful coexistence but to overcome interstate structures and promote supra-national entities.[68] It is often overlooked that neo-functionalism is to a certain extent a normative theory. In the late 1950s and 1960s, when the neo-functional approach gained momentum, there was no strong and long lasting political community of states in the global arena – not even in Europe. We only know with the advantage of hindsight that the European states would form a strong political union and stay in line with neo-functionalist's thoughts. In the 1960s, there were some indications but no proof that Europe's political landscape would develop in the way it did. Therefore Haas' and his colleagues' work must be seen as a normative theory in some parts, particularly with regard to the formation of *political* unions. For this reasons it is interesting to pose the question whether neo-functionalists were blinded by the historical setting. Were they wrong when assuming that economic integration forms the nucleus of every integration process?

The AU is different from many other integration processes in the global arena, e.g. the EU, ECOWAS, NAFTA and SADC. The latter started – as Hass theorizes – by integrating economically. This is not the case on Africa's continental level. In fact, the OAU was

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[67] See Thomas Conzelmann 2003, 'Neofunktionlismus'. Pp. 141-168 in *Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen,* Siegfried Schieder and Manuela Spindler (eds.). Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
[68] Ibid.

established in 1963 to promote the twin goals of 'liberation' and 'unity'.[69] It was never an economic union. The Lagos Plan of Action from 1980[70] attempted to provide guidance for an economic recovery and the Abuja Treaty from 1991[71] aimed at establishing a continental market as well as an economic and monetary union by 2027. Both attempts remain mere ideas. Little appropriate action has been taken to achieve the goals of these two initiatives.[72]

Despite this difference there is a remarkable parallel between the continents. Like Europe, Africa has suffered in the past. The African continent experienced centuries of colonization and decades of civil wars including genocide in the post-colonial area. Africans are still suffering from civil wars, genocides and gross human rights violations. Drawing on this experience and knowing that the security situation in Africa is far from stable, Africa's leadership decided to build a peace and security architecture collectively. The AU's Peace and Security Council is just one component of it. Other components are the five stand-by brigades and the African Court of Human Rights. Africa has a highly developed security architecture – even though it is sometimes highly ineffective. The question emerges why cooperation in the field of security shall not serve as starting point for an integration process. The building up of a security architecture is at least implicitly inspired by continentalization dynamics as the establishment is a collective undertaking. This becomes obvious by the fact that Africa's leadership committed itself to a collective approach and – as the four above mentioned military interventions show – employs the mechanism.

The view that any integration process and any analysis hereof must start with the economic dimension is challenged. It might be rightfully argued that a stable security situation is a necessary condition for an integration process to unfold in the first place. However, security cooperation might also be seen as starting point of integration. Integration can also have its roots in the stabilization of a defined geographical area. The regionalization/continentalization dynamics might inspire 'spill-over' to other policy fields such as economy and trade. It is wrong to assume that regionalization/continentalization has only an economic dimension. When the European project started in the 1950s, Europeans had the privilege to life under relatively stable conditions. Their leaders where aware of the past and did what they could do

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[69] Kingsley C. Nwakanma 1982, *The Concept of Pan-Africanism,* Ibaban, Ororo Publications, 1982, p: 9.

[70] http://www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/docs/lagos_plan.pdf

[71] http://www.uneca.org/itca/ariportal/abuja.htm

[72] For a detailed analysis see Economic Commission for Africa 2004, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa.* Addis Ababa: ECA Policy Research Report and Economic Commission for Africa 2006, *Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II,* Addis Ababa: ECA and AU.

to prevent history from repeating itself. It is often forgotten that the EU is not a sole economic community. It was also set up to secure peace in post-war Europe. In short, there is no insurmountable difference between the situation in Europe and Africa. Taking the historical perspective into account it is deceptive to limit the starting point of integration to economic cooperation.

While Europe's leadership drove the integration from a security and economic perspective, Africa's leadership is currently stuck at driving the integration only from a security perspective. The economic dimension remains the task of the regional economic communities such as ECOWAS and SADC. If one broadens the neo-functional approach by accepting that other policy fields might also serve as starting point for the integration, there is no problem in applying this theoretical framework to the African setting. Moreover, there are good reasons to assume that regionalization/continentalization dynamics also have a non-economic component.

Laurie Nathan emphasizes that integration processes have two 'logics': an 'internal logic' and an 'external logic'. The former refers to the objective conditions that make an institutional integration a beneficial venture for the member states, whereas the latter refers to normative congruence, i.e. shared norms and values among the members of the organization.[73] For integration to be successful and sustainable, both logics are required.

As stressed above, there seems to be no normative congruence on a continental level in Africa. The different understandings of the key concepts of democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights point that out. However, it cannot be ruled out that such a normative congruence emerges over time. Continentalization can certainly inspire such congruence, particularly if one accepts that this dynamic has a non-economic dimension. There is no doubt that it is important to have the external logic in place first. If the established supra-national organization is considered as beneficial venture for the member states they are likely to drive the regionalization/continentalization dynamics to forge a stronger union in order to strengthen the ties between the states they have established. The European Union is a model case for this. It started as a beneficial venture for the member states in economic terms. Leaders saw a need to bring not only the governmental structures together but to make the European Union a union of the people. This helps strengthen the regionalization on the

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[73] Laurie Nathan 2004. *The Absence of Common Values and Failure of Common Security in Southern Africa 1992-2003*.

grassroots level. A development like this could happen in Africa, too. However, it seems unlikely at this early stage. The value paradox has highlighted this. There is yet no shared set of norms as values on a continental scale in Africa. Furthermore, the discussion of the interest paradox revealed that large parts of Africa's leadership have little interest in the integration to proceed. As a result they do little to promote continentalization. It is interesting to observe whether there will be a change in the foreseeable future. It might be rightfully argued that the establishment of a peace and security architecture is as beneficial for African states (external logic) that it automatically causes continentalization to accelerate, which in turn could form an internal logic. There are some signs that the stalled principles of sovereignty and non-interference might erode when a new generation of leaders comes into office. It appears that states governed by leaders who were not part of the liberation struggle of their countries as well as democratically elected leaders tend to contribute to continentalization dynamics and champion integration on a regional and continental level. This claim is based on primary observation. It remains subject to further research.[74]

Conclusion

The three paradoxes described above imply little room for a move forward to the United States of Africa. It appears that the integration process in Africa at a continental level is stalled. Among other reasons, this is due to widely absent continentalization dynamics from the leadership, but also from civil society and non-state actors. For a variety of reasons, Africa's leadership seems to have only little interest in a strong AU structure. Encouraging signs are the military interventions in Burundi, Comoros, Somalia and Sudan. At the same time, there are setbacks, e.g. the little vigour in approaching the situation in Zimbabwe in the aftermath of the elections in 2008[75] or the coup in Madagascar in spring 2009. Overall the principles of sovereignty and non-interference remain strong in place hampering the integration sustainably. There are only little continentalization dynamics observable. However, there are signs that the establishment of a peace and security architecture might serve as a starting point for integration to spill over to other policy fields.

From a theoretical point, the paper argued that Africa does not need to be treated as a special case. Neo-functionalism as standard International Relations theory for integration processes

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[74] Martin Welz forthcoming
[75] See Martin Welz and Julian Junk, forthcoming

can be applied. Neo-functionalist narrow thoughts must be extended by acknowledging non-economic factors as starting points of integration processes. Regionalization/continent-talization research must not be reduced to the economic dimension but broadened by including political, cultural and social factors. It appears in the African case that the peace and security architecture is either the starting point of the integration process or at least its prologue. Integration certainly proceeds once the continent is politically stable and if Africa's leadership sees the benefits from integration, it will be seen not only in economical terms. Africa's political landscape is changing rapidly. The rapid change might have positive impacts on the integration efforts and in any case make the continent an interesting case to observe in the near future.